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1

CHAPTER

I

This paper is an investigation of some philosophical facets of a legal problem. The legal problem is
that of the insanity defense, through which an acquittal

may be gained if the accused committed the criminal act
charged against him but is not responsible for that act
because of insanity. Criminal irresponsibility due to

insanity is defined differently in different jurisdic-

tions by the so-called insanity tests. Since the insanity
tests are central to the workings of the insanity defense
"the insanity defense," strictly speaking, names a variety
of procedures. However, I will use the term loosely

throughout this paper to designate the class of procedures rather than any particular instance or variation
of it. The insanity defense is not merely a trial pro-

cedure, for the issue of insanity may be raised long

before trial, as early as the time of arrest, and may

continue to be an issue in the disposition of the defendant until he is released from the custody of the state.
It is this entire procedure that is at issue in this

paper.

There has always been general dissatisfaction

with the particular tests and procedures employed by the
courts in criminal trials with a plea of insanity, and
although improved tests have been proffered, criticism

2

has not abated. The solution to the legal problem of the
insane offender will be a procedure which is consistent

with the purposes of the system of criminal justice, and
which will accommodate fair or just treatment of the
insane offender

- - a

procedure only approximated by any

currently applied.

The paper is organized into three parts. Chapter
I

is a presentation of the various insanity tests with

a discussion of some important philosophical and practical

difficulties with each. This discussion is intended to
convey the workings of the insanity defense, to uncover
the ethical principles underlying the tests, and to

support the claim that improving the tests will not solve

the main problems with the defense. Chapter II considers

these main difficulties. Among the major objections to

current procedure are; (i) the unacceptable and apparently
inevitable domination of expert witnesses over trials

with insanity pleas; (ii) the trauma of criminal proceedings inflicted without gain on insane offenders; (iii)

the unfair practice of meting out indeterminately long
"sentences'* in mental hospitals to those who successfully

plead insanity, making the plea unattractive to those for

whom it was designed.
Chapter III is an argument for one alternative
that the
to the insanity defense. H.L.A.Hart has argued

^

.
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insanity dsfsns© should bG rsplacGd by a post— tirial
insanity hearing for any convicted criminals who may be

excusable from responsibility because they are insane.
Hart has given good reasons for replacing the insanity

defense with another procedure, but has failed to give
reasons for preferring a post -trial hearing to a pretrial hearing on the insanity issue. A procedure which

allows for the possibility of a pre-trial hearing will
be argued for on the grounds that the post-trial hearing

may sometimes constitute an extravagant waste of the
court's time and an unfair imposition unnecessarily
imposed upon the defendant

The Insanity Tests

Each test of insanity offers some property as
sufficient for irresponsibility. The law holds that any

defendant who has done a criminal act but who has the

property set out in the test for the jurisdiction is not
responsible for

that act. The law also holds that a

person who is not responsible for a crime should not be

punished for the crime. Thus, underlying each insanity
test is an ethical principle: A person having the property

named in the test should not be punished for his breach
of the law. Of course, "should" here might be given a

H.L.A.Hart, Punishment and Responsibility
Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), Ch.VII.
1.

,

(Oxford:

.
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legal non-ethical reading, as in "Cars should not be

parked on the north side of Chestnut Street on the first
day of each month," However, the insanity test seems to

embody a strong ethical intuition which most of us

presumably share, that it is morally wrong to punish a
person who only broke the law because he was insane.^
Assuming, then, that the tests imply cetain ethical
principles, one of the fundamental philosophical problems

surrounding the insanity defense is to discover the
relative merits of the principles underlying the various

tests

The M*Naghten Test
.to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong.
;

,

.

The fundamental question raised by the ethical
principle excusing insane offenders is: Why should an
insane person be excused from responsibility? The answer

implicit in M'Naghten is that insane persons

^ not

know

what they are doing or else that what they are doing is
wrong. Part of the strength of this account is that the

insane person not only does not know, but also, in some
sense he cannot know the nature of his acts. At least the

For objections to the principle, see Thomas Szasz, LaWi
Liberty and Psychiatry (New York: Collier, 1963).
2.

,
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ignorance of an insane person is not of a reckless nature.
Ordinarily, outside the law,

**I

did not know

was doing

I

that,” or "I did not know that that was wrong," counts
as a good excuse unless there is some presumption that

I

should have known, in which case my ignorance is my own
fault and so is no excuse. The insane generally fall un-

der no such presumption, and so their lack of knowledge
seems a reasonable excuse

The M'Naghten rule suffers from two important
conceptual obscurities. One of these is that it is unclear
what "know" means in the test. The major controversy over
the M'Naghten test has been between those who claim that
"know" should be read narrowly to involve only cognitive

or intellectual awareness, and those who claim that
"know" should be more broadly construed to involve emotional as well as intellectual appreciation of the act, its

consequences, and its overall context. Those who argue
for the broad construal of "know" point out that knowing

what one is doing ordinarily

involves motivation, and

not merely behaving insanely and without motive. Since

knowing what one is doing, in this sense, is

a

necessary

condition for mens rea, the broad construal seems preferable. While it is none too clear what the distinction
is between the broad and narrow readings of "know," it
is nevertheless very clear that some such distinction

can be made, and since the M’Naghten test itself leaves

'
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it unclear which interpretation is correct, it is

dangerously ambiguous.
The second difficulty with M’Naghten concerns
the meaning of the word "wrong". The major battle here

has raged over whether "wrong" means legally or morally
wrong. The test itself offers no clue as to which sort
of wrongdoing determines guilt, and there are difficulties

with either interpretation.
If we interpret "wrong" as "against the law"

then ignorance of the law is defense for breaking it
for the insane. This might seem reasonable since the

insane not only may fail to know the law, but may fail
to be capable of it, so that they may not be accountable
for their ignorance. Also, one reason ignorance does

not ordinarily excuse is that the practice of admitting
such a defense would greatly diminish the deterent effect
of criminal sanctions. It is widely agreed, however, that

the loss of deference resulting from the practice of

excusing the insane is negligible, and the particular
rationale for allowing the excuse is of no consequence.
However, the principle underlying this rationale
seems incorrect. The underlying principle seems to be
that all and only those unable to know the law are

irresponsible. This seems at the same time too broad
and too narrow. It is too narrow because there are quite

obviously irresponsible persons who are quite capable of

.
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learning the law but who are unable to use what they
know
to guide their behavior. The most obvious example is

compulsive behavior

- -

the kleptomaniac knows he steals,

he simply cannot refrain from it. On the other hand,
the reading of M'Naghten seems too broad because there
are no doubt persons who are so are so morally debauched

that although they are unable to know the law due to
some impairment, even if they could know the law, they

would not hesitate to disobey it
On the other hand, mere moral wrongness will
not do either as the interpretation of "wrong" in
M'Naghten. By this interpretation, the M'Naghten test

•

impies that an offender is innocent even if he knew his
act to be against the law, so long as he was unable to

understand the immorality of his act because of his
impairment. If this were the case, the law could not

successfully impose sanctions against acts that are

morally permissible, since no one could know such acts
to be immoral

.

The underlying principle might be read

slightly differently to

avoid this criticism by stipu-

lating that the inability to know the immorality of the
illegal act is not because of the logical impossibility
of knowing it to be immoral, but because of mental impair-

ment. However, even if the principle could be seated so
as to avoid obvious counter-examples, the principle would

still be unclear because there is no indication as to

•
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whether "wrong" means "against one's own standards" or
"against community standards." One's own standards may
be so peculiar that inability to Know that one's act
is against one's own moral standards may be irrelevant

for legal purposes; and community standards are quite

nebulous so that it may well be impossible to determine
if an act violates those standards.

In his book, The Insanity Defense

,

Abraham

Goldstein argues that these difficulties over interpretations of the key words in M'Naghten are irrelevant in
practice. As to the problem about what "know" means,

Goldstein claims that the real difficulty here is that
the narrow interpretation would make the insanity defense

impossibly difficult for the defendant, and, he points
out, no court imposes the narrow reading, while many do

explicitly opt for the broad one. As to difficulties with
the meaning of "wrong" the insanity defense is almost

exclusively exercised in cases in which the crime charged
is "sufficiently serious as to make society's moral

judgement identical with the legal standard."''

The claim that the obscurities of meaning in

M'Naghten have no practical import ignores the problems
such obscurities impose on the defense, and to a lesser

extent on the jury as well. For the defense, the vagueness

Abraham Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (New Haven;
Yale Univ. Press, 1967), p. 52.
3.

\
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of the test makes it impossible to determine exactly
what

needs proving for exculpation. Should the defense try to
prove that the defendant did not understand that his act

was illegal, or that it was immoral? And if the defense
focuses on the moral construal of the test, should it
take the moral standards of the community or of the

defendant? And what are to count as the moral standards
of the community? One effect of leaving these questions

unanswered is that the defense must prove too much: it
must answer all of these questions to be sure to satisfy
the jury that the defendant is innocent.

Without guidance beyond what is in the test,
juries will almost inevitably have to take up these

questions themselves. Surely it is not a good test that
leaves the jury to ponder complicated issues of philosophy,
jurisprudence, and psychiatry.
It is important that in the insanity defense,

ordinarily the defense and not the prosecution bears the
burden of proof. It is the job of the defense to prove
that the defendant meets the requirements of the test.

Thus the vagueness of the test further and unfairly
burdens the defense.
Finally, the M’Naghten test has been widely

criticised for failure to accommodate the cases of

defendants whose mental abnormalities impair behavior

10
ratliGr tfean cognitivG and Giriotional facultiGs.

It sGGms VGry rGasonablG to say of CGrtain offondGrs that

thGy know and approciatG thG naturG of thoir offGnsGs,
but arG unablG to control thoir bGhavior, so that thoir

offGnsGs arG committGd unwillfully and yGt knowingly.

ThG klGptomaniac stGals knowing that ho is stGaling, and
pGrhaps GVGn wishing that he wGrG not stGaling. A major

inadGquacy of M'NaghtGn is that it impliGs that an

offGndGr who know thG wrongnGss of his act should be

punished even if he could not control his act. On the
grounds that such a person ought not be punished, many
jurisdictions have added the so-called "irresistable
impulse" test to M'Naghten.

The Irresistable Impulse Test A defendant is relieved
from responsibility if at the time of the act he suffered
from a mental disease such that he could not have controlled his conduct.
;

The irresistable impulse test is misnamed in
that the test does not confine itself to acts which are
of a sudden or impulsive nature,

as

the word "impulse"

implies. On the contrary, the lack of control may be

longstanding. The test, then, implies that an insane

offender should be excused from responsibility because
he cannot control his actions. We shall henceforth call

this test the control test

.

The control test is quite obviously insufficient
since those who can control their behavior may neverthe—

.
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less be unable to know or appreciate their
significance.

Such people fit the M’Naghten test, and so the two are
very often used together.
A person who does an act but who is unable to
P^^vent himself from doing

the;

act, or from doing some

other act causally sufficient for that act, is not

morally responsible for the act. Loosely speaking, such
an act is not the product of the agent’s will, but is the

product of something else. When the kleptomaniac steals,
one might say that it is not the kleptomaniac

,

but the

kleptomania which causes the theft to happen. Thus the
control test raises the issue of the relation between
the illegal act and the disease. This relation is known
as the product relation

,

or more simply, productivity

,

and the problem of productivity is also introduced in

the ALI and the Durham test

The ALT Test A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of
his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.
;

The Durham Test ... an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect.
:

Judge Bazelon has argued,

I

believe correctly,

that the ALI test conceals a productivity requirement

because it allows for no workable alternative to conclusory testimony on this issue from experts. Under ALI,
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the impairment which results from the disease must be
of the kind that could produce the criminal act if the

defendant is to be acquitted. Thus the majority opinion
in Brawner, which adopted ALI

,

points out that the "men-

tal disease of a kleptomaniac does not entail as a 'result'
a lack of capacity to conform to the law prohibiting rape."^

Under ALI

,

once the defendant has been determined to have

had some mental abnormality, the central question becomes:
"Was the impairment which

resial ted

from this disease of

the sort that could produce or cause the criminal act?"

This is, in essence, the question of productivity.
The Control, the Durham, and the ALI test, then,
include the productivity requirement; that is, the

criminal act must have been the product of mental

disorder if the defendant is to be acquitted. The pro•ductivity requirement seems to arise from the reasonable

supposition that an insane person can commit a crime
and be held responsible if the insanity is not related
to the crime. Surely the kleptomaniac is not excused from

responsibility for wanton murder because of his mental
abnormality. And so the productivity requirement seems

reasonable enough.

4. United

States v. Brawner 471 F. 2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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N0VGirthGlBss , ©inbodiGd in th© productivity

r©quir©m©nt is a naiv©

und©rstanding of th© r©lation

b©tw©©n mind and body, or b©tw©©n th© actions and mind
of a person. Whil© it is quit© clear that it would b©

to say that a sever© case of kleptomania caused
a person to commit wanton and profitless murder,

it is

not at all clear that it would be correct to say that

the same case of kleptomania caused the person to steal.

Consider the following problem of analysis. What does it

mean to say:
(1)

The act A at time t was the product of
disease or defect M.

a

mental

As an example, consider the following entry under
”dypsomania"in Black’s Law Dictionary

:

Dipsomania
An irresistable impulse to indulge in
in intoxication, either alcohol or other drugs - opiums. This mania, or dipsomania, is classed as one
of the minor forms of insanity. Repeated intoxication
for a number of years, which is entirely voluntary
is not dipsomania. One having the power to refrain
from the use of intoxicants, and who becomes intoxicated voluntarily, is not affected with dipsomania.
:

Other mental disorders involving compulsion are similarly
defined. Kleptomania consists "in an irresistable pro-

pensity to steal;" homocidal mania "manifests itself
in an irresistable inclination or impulse to commit

homocide." The mania-type disorders seem the most likely
to fit the productivity requirement since other types
of disorders have more disparate and less easily identi-

fiable symptoms.

.

.
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As a specific problem of analysis, then, let us consider:
(2)

John s taking a drink at time
of his dipsomania.
I

t

was the product

John's dipsomania consists in an "irresistable impulse"

which is not really an impulse at all, and should be
understood as a disposition to drink which may be

momentary and episodic or chronic. The disposition is
of the nature of a compulsion, so that other dispositions

John may have at t and which may be in conflict with his
disposition to drink will be, in some sense, inoperative
at t

The type of thing which is said to "produce"

John's act of taking a drink is a disposition.

Naively

it seems clear enough that an impulse or a disposition

in a person to do some act can produce that act

,

so

long as certain other conditions obtain; eg. that the
act is one that it is possible for the person to do. It

might also seem clear enough that the stronger an impulse
or disposition is, the more likely it is that it will

produce the act

There are two main difficulties with this naive
understanding. One is that it is for from clear what a

disposition is. Secondly, given some understanding of
what a disposition is, what does it mean to say of such
a thing that it produced or caused a certain act? The

first problem, then, is to give an analysis of:

:

.

.
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(3)

John's disposition, D, caused him to do an act of
type A at a time t.
We might analyze "S has a disposition, at t,

to do an act A" as a subjunctive conditional. Under cer-

tain conditions, C, S would drink if he had dipsomania
but would not if he did not. If we could describe C, we

could analyze "S has dipsomania at t” as "S is such that
if any of C obtained at t, then S would drink at t."

The analysis this approach will yield will
not be an analysis of (3), since, strictly speaking,
it will be an analysis of
(3a)

John's having a disposition, D, caused him to
do an act A at t
,

,

This will pose no important difficulties, although John's
having a disease may well "produce" certain acts which
the disease itself does not produce. Kleptomania does

not cause sufferers from it to seek therapy, yet having

kleptomania might. For the most part, the influence John's
disposition has on his behavior will be the same as the
influence

hi.s

having the disposition will have.

The subjunctive conditional analysis of (3a)
(3b)

is:

John's being such that if any of the conditions
C held at any time, t, then John would do an act
of type A caused John to do an act A at t'

There are several problems with the subjunctive
conditional analysis of a disposition like dipsomania.
One of these is that, for a variety of reasons, the

.

.
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description of the relevant conditions, C, needed
to
complete the analysis is unavailable. One reason is that
science has discovered only so much about mental disorders. Presumably some of the conditions underlying

mental disorders are organic, and these are not yet known
any of the abnormalities likely to give rise to

criminal behavior. A second reason is that a full listing
of ^11 the conditions under which a given dipsomaniac

would drink but under which he would not drink if he
were not a dipsomaniac would simply be too long to

enumerate. In any case, the sort of complicated organic
disorder which might be part of the conditions we are
looking for would be of little help to a jury trying to
determine if the disorder caused the accused to commit
a crime

A second problem with the subjunctive conditional analysis is that the conditions, C, will not only

include what we might call the "extraordinary" conditions

underlying the disorder, but also the "ordinary" conditions

which must obtain if a person is to do a particular act.
C, for example, will include that S is alive and well

enough to do A, if the subjunctive is to be true. Thus
to say that S s doing A at t was the product of a
*

disease D is really to say that D, together with many
other disparate conditions joined together into some

complex causal chain leading up to S

*

s

doing A at t

:

17

If this is what "produce" means here, then the defense

must prove that such a causal chain existed, and this
is an unrealistic burden for the defense to bear.

A third problem with the subjunctive conditional analysis of dispositions is that it may not be clear

enough for our purposes. We are looking for clarification of what it means to say that a certain disposition

caused an act. To say, to this end, that the agent's

being such that some subjunctive conditional is true of

him caused the act is not greatly clarifying because
the meaning of disposition terms or sentences is not

significantly more mysterious than the nature of subjunctive conditionals.
Finally, some have complained that the product-

ivity requirement
of it

—

—

independent of any particular analysis

may compel the jury to speculate unjustifiably.

Judge Bazelon, in his dissenting opinion in Brawner

,

held

that
the productivity requirement tends to focus the
attention of expert witnesses and the jury on
extraneous issues, and to divert them from the
core of the question of responsibility. Durham
suggested that the government could establish
criminal responsibility either by proving freedom from illness or by proving that the illness
did not cause the act And one way to prove that
the illness did not cause the act is to prove that
the defendant would have done it anyway. C arter
even more explicitly than Durham invited the government to establish responsibility by proving
that the defendant would have committed the act
even if he had not been ill. Carter stated that
.
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productivity amounted to causation of the "but for"
variety; an act is the product of mental disease
if
accused "would not have committed the act
he did commit if he had not been diseased as he
was." This approach invited experts and juries to
speculate about the defendant's character, and
convict him on the ground that he would have been
"bad" if he had not been sick.^
Moreover, given our subjunctive conditional analysis, the
jury will also be forced to speculate about whe^-her or

not the conditions

which obtained were in fact C -condi-

tions. Since in many cases not even the experts will

know the answer, the jury’s speculation on this matter
may be unjustified and wild.
The concept of productivity seems to resist
clear and simple analysis; what seemed to be a fairly
simple notion is only deceivingly so. The productivity

tests are, for this reason, deceivingly simple in their

application by the jury. Not only is the notion of pro-

ductivity unclear, but its analysis in (3b) raises some
difficult technical problems, about which conditions are

C-conditions

.

The conditions, C, will include details

about the defendant's mental and physiological state.

These elements of C may be beyond the jury’s comprehension. Furthermore, in case of conflicting expert

testimony on these matters, the jury will be unable to
evaluate the relative merits of the competing claims.
Finally, the jury members will be unable to decide for

themselves whether any condition an expert claims is a
5.

United States v. Brawner 471

F.

2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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C-condition is in fact a condition that would correctly
complete the analysis.
One test which is not employed in any juris-

diction, but which is nevertheless a promising alternative to those in current use is the test proposed by

Judge Bazelon in Brawner

.

The Bazelon Test
,a defendant is not responsible if
at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behavior controls were impaired to
such an extent that he cannot justly be held reponsible
for his act.
;

.

.

In his dissenting opinion in that case, Bazelon

argued that the ALI and Durham tests, which alone combine
the knowledge and control requirements, are nevertheless

unsatisfactory because they tend to focus the entire
trial onto the testimony of experts, and because the

productivity requirement focuses both the experts' and
the jurors* attention on inappropriate issues rather

than on the main issue of responsibility.
The problem of expert domination of insanity

trials will be discussed at some length

later on, but

there are, in essence, two such problems. One is that
the testimony of expert psychiatric witnesses as to the

mental state of the defendant is usually incomprehensible
to the jury. The other problem relates to the first; it
is that the technical and esoteric testimony proffered

by psychiatric witnesses disguises underlying moral

20

judgements by these witnesses as to the responsibility
of the defendant. The moral responsibility of the defen^^rit is

generally considered to be a matter outside the

expertise of the witnesses, and yet the jury is often
subjected to highly prejudicial and inappropriate

testimony simply because the inappropriateness is well
concealed.
In order to circumvent these difficulties,

Bazelon argues, the test should not try to define responsibility in terms of productivity or in any other terms,
but should instead leave the problem of judging respon-

sibility entirely up to the jury.

The Bazelon test, then, answers the question,
"Why should an insane offender be excused from responsi-

bility?” with the simplest possible answer; "Because the
insane offender is not justly held responsible."

Rather than offering criteria of responsibility the
Bazelon test merely guides the jury in such

a

way as to

make the issue of responsibility primary in their con-

siderations

.

The Bazelon test is arguably the test most
likely to achieve its purpose. While it fails to define

responsibility for the jury, it does focus the jury’s
attention on that fundamental issue. The justification
for this test, particularly its failure to define

.responsibility, is that the jury, as a surrogate for

21

tliG

pGoplG

,

brings with it to trial thG currGnt conununity

standards. SincG community standards changG, tGsts which

dGfinG responsibility may tend to fix that concept
unjustifiably. The M’Naghten test, for example, came
to be viewed as too narrow because it was unadaptable

to the evolving modern model of human psychology.

In spite of its apparent advantages, there are
several important points against the Bazelon test. One
of these is that the test itself, by virtue of its

failure to define insanity, leaves the law so vague as
to raise serious doubt about its constitutionality.

Were a jurisdiction to employ only the Bazelon test,
the jury members would have only their various senses
of justice to go on, since the test defines nothing for

them and makes an explicit appeal only to each juror's
sense of justice. Since senses of justice vary widely

from juror to juror, if no further guide is provided
them, their verdicts will be reached on very different

grounds. Thus, under the Bazelon test, the law lacks a

certain desirable rigidity, and perhaps constitutionality,
since it is unconstitutional to convict a man where the

standards of illegality are vague and ill-defined. The

Bazelon test fails to define the standard of responsibility
and so might be unconstitutional in application.
It might be argued that the Bazelon test could

22

be employed as the insanity test without this attendant

vaguness by coupling the test with jury instructions
that would clarify the test. One possibility here is to

require the judge to mention in his charge to the jury
some of the other tests that have been thought to specify
the conditions which excuse defendants from criminal

responsibility. This would provide the jury with further
guidance, not provided by the Bazelon test, without

imposing any of these other tests on the jury. One of the

problems with the other tests is that, as putative defi-

nitions of insanity, they tend to straight jacket the
jury by limiting the considerations that are relevant

under them. Employing the Bazelon test while mentioning
some or all of the others would guide the jury's consider-

ations without restricting them unduely.

Even so employed, the Bazelon test would not
escape all of the problems with the other tests. For
example, if much of the testimony of the experts focused

upon the defendant’s state of knowledge when the crime
was committed, the best guide the jury would have would
be the M'Naghten test. The obscurities about what "know"

and "wrong" mean in that test would again pose problems
for the jury. Similarly, the productivity tests would
be just as unclear under Bazelon as on their own. That

the law does not require the jury to use M’Naghten or
the product tests is of little help if it is forced to
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use one of these by the lack of any better guide.
Thus, if Bazelon is employed by itself, it does

not sufficiently define the concept of irresponsibility,
and if it is used in conjunction with the other tests,

the jury is still encumbered by the main obscurities of
those other tests.
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CHAPTER

II

The problems with the insanity defense run
deeper and wider than mere philosophical obscurities in
the tests. The procedure abuses the insane offender by

forcing him needlessly through traumatic criminal procedings, and thereby also wasting the time of the courts.

rss a procedure, the insanity defense is unjust insofar
as it fails to lead to just results. Presumably, the
just result of a procedure like the insanity defense

would be that insane offenders are exculpated. Yet
insane offenders are regularly punished in our system

because the consequences of raising the defense are so

odious as to discourage its use and because those who do
raise it may be punished upon

courtroom

procedure, the insanity defense needlessly creates

communication problems of major proportions since it
brings together medical experts, legal experts, and
jurors presumably lacking in medical and legal expertise,
in a rigid and formalistic framework.

We may somewhat arbitrarily sort the problems

with the insanity defense into two groups:

(1)

problems

of evidence or communication, and (2) problems of

fairness. The first group is centered around reaching
the verdict. The jury, and not the group of experts, is
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charged with reaching a verdict, and the difficulties
involved in conveying the right information to the jury
in comprehensible form pose

the hazard that the jury

will, in effect, abdicate its responsibility to the

experts. The second group of problems concern the defen-

dant and the inability of the procedure to make a dispo-

sition on his case in a fair manner. To an extent, the
second group overlaps with the first since a fair

verdict will depend on the accuracy of the information
conveyed to the jury.

Group

1

:

Some Problems About Evidence

There are two main problems about evidence in
an insanity trial.

fl

One is that expert testimony is not

understood by the jury; and even if the testimony itself
is comprehended, the underlying scientific bases for

such testimony are not understood. Thus|^ither the

testimony or the scientific bases for it fail to reach
the jurors for their scrutiny and analysi^ The second

problem is that the testimony is conclusory as to the
ultimate legal-moral issue of responsibility, and this
is of course aggravated by the fact that these conclu-

sions as well as the bases for them are obscured by the

Rules of evidence in some jurisdictions restrict the
admission of evidence about the defendant’s mental state
if it does not bear directly on insanity as defined in the
test. This raises a third evidentiary problem, but which
is no longer widespread enough to merit discussion here.
6.

.
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technical jargon in which they are framed.
Expert testimony on insanity differs according
the nature of the trial. In some cases, this testi-

mony provides the jury with a consistent and coherent
analysis of the defendant's psychological history and
make-up. More often, however, the prosecution and defense

witnesses disagree. When this happens, each side is
forced to back up its claims with supporting evidence,
and this naturally leads to a battle among experts over

esoterica
f^o testimony of this sort can contribute to

a fair verdict, and the defendant is the most likely to

be harmed in such a battle of experts. As the claims in

support of his defense become more esoteric, they become

more susceptible to derogation by the prosecute^ The

defense has set about proving that the defendant was insane at some remote past time. If a battle erupts the

defense will present the sorts of scientific evidence

quite familiar to psychologists and psychiatrists, but
alien to jurors; eg., Rorschach tests. frhe prosecution
will reply in kind> however the prosecution also has

availible the tactic of casting aspersions on the
abstract and tenuous nature of the debate. By appealing
to the ignorance of the jury, the prosecutor may foil

the defense attempts to prove what it set out to prove

.
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While there are limits to permissible conduct
in court, the prosecutor can clearly make such an appeal

and influence the verdict. In Brawner, the court, meeting

en banc , refused to reverse Bravmer's conviction in
spite of the following remarks by the prosecutor;
Now, another one, you remember, on the same test,
that drawing test the doctor said he had Len of
those little things and they hadsquiggles and lines
and angles, and he was asked to draw those, ten of
them separately. And the doctor said he rotated,
he rotated one. And I said, well, what was the
significance of that. Well the significance of that
is that shows there is organic brain damage... That
is a hard indicator, that is a hard indicator of
organic brain damage... It is your function to
take that evidence and decide whether what that
doctor said as far as you are concerned made any
sense at all.^
,

.

(This last remark was especially pernicious since even

prosecution witnesses agreed that Brawner had organic
brain damage)

The labels attached to the disorder by the

various witnesses gives some indication of the jury's
problem in evaluating expert testimony; "psychologic
brain syndrome associated with convulsive disorder,"

"personality disorder, disorder associated with epilepsy,"
"explosive personality, or epileptic personality disorder,"

"explosive personality with epileptoid personality
disorder."®
7.

United States v. Brawner

8

Ibid, p. 1014.

,

op. cit. p. 1003, f tnt

.

77.

iThe jury

simply cannot weigh conflicting

evidence of the sort proffered by psychiatric experts.

The real import of such testimony is lost in the technical jaugon, and what reaches the jury and affects

their verdict are the less admirable aspects of the
battle

—

the rhetoric and sophistry, as well as the

conclusory judgements about the defendant's guilt or

innocenc^
In light of the very unsatisfactory relation

between the experts and the jury, efforts have been
made to improve the tests in the hope that so doing
will improve the presentation of expert testimony.

Recently, the main efforts in this direction have been

focused on the productivity requirement. It has been
realized through courtroom experience that tests
framed in terms of a "product" relation between the
act and the disorder of the defendant inevitably lead

experts to testify about the moral and legal responsibility of the defendant.
f'

The reason for this is quite simple. There
are, loosely speaking, but two contenders for the

responsibility for the crime: the disorder and the
defendant. Under the product tests, the psychiatric

witness will naturally be called on to testify as to

whether the crime was, or could have been, the product
of the defendant's disorder. If it was the product of

.
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th© disorder, then the defendant is not responsible;
and if not, then by elimination, the defendant is

responsible. Thus testimony about the productivity issue
is, by simple logic, testimony about the legal-moral

responsibility of the defendant.
Bazelon argues that some other test, the test
we have been calling the Bazelon test, is preferable
to the product tests because it makes clear that the

ultimate issue is that of responsibility, and this

makes it easier to spot conclusory and inappropriate
testimony. Furthermore, tests couched explicitly in

terms of "productivity" draw the jury's attention
away from their primary concern to such issues as
the proper analysis of terms like "product," "cause,"
and "the decisive difference between doing and not

doing the act." What these terms mean is not at issue;
at issue is only whether or not the defendant is

responsible

Even critics of the productivity requirement
agree that for exculpation, some meaningful relation

must hold between the mental disorder and the criminal
act of the defendant, and that the relationship must be

causal in nature. Thus Bazelon admits:

.
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Durham did not invent the question of causality
Every responsibility test demands some link
between the defendant
act and his impairment;
s
Durham merely gave explicit
recognition to the
issue Thus the critical question is not whether
the act must be related to the impairment
but rather how directly, if at all, the jury’s
attention should be focused on the question.^
’

_

.

.

.

Since exculpation demands some productive
or causal link, there is no way of avoiding this issue,
and Bazelon’s suggestion that the jury should net focus
on this question "directly, if at all" is misconceived.

First of all, as already pointed out, the questions of

responsibility and productivity are, and are quite
obviously, functionally and logically equivalent for
the purposes of the jury once the existence of a mental

impairment has been established. The simple truth is
that the defendant is irresponsible

and only if

(i) he was mentally sick at the time of the act, and

(ii) his sickness caused ("produced," "resulted in," etc.)

the crime. This is so obvious that the jury cannot

possibly avoid consideration of the second condition
of irresponsibility; nor can the prosecution or defense
do their jobs without investigating that issue through
the examination of witnesses.

Secondly, Bazelon wants to avoid expert

testimony, couched as it is in scientific and seemingly

certain terms, directed at the issue of the defendant’s
9.

United States v. Brawner, op. cit.

p.

1022.
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responsibility. What Bazelon fails to see is that
no
test or definition, however vague, can help but focus
the

remarks of expert witnesses on just that issue.

To see that this is so, consider the ALI test:
A person is not responsible... (if) as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.

Under this test, it will be a routine matter for psychiatric witnesses to testify directly as to the capacities
of the defendant at the time of the crime. In fact, the

Washington decision, as subsequently revised in Brawner,
requires that the following guidelines be read to

psychiatric witnesses;
As an expert witness, you may, if you wish and if
you feel you can, give your opinion whether at the
time of his conduct the defendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect, and whether,
a result
defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law (Emphasis

^

,

.

added)

The psychiatric witness, while forbidden from

testifying about the responsibility or blameworthiness
of the defendant, is invited to testify that the defendant

has or lacks those characteristics which the court
explicitly holds sufficient for exculpation. By stipulation, embodied in the ALI test, one who lacks certain

capacities thereby lacks responsibility. To invite

witnesses to make judgements as to the defendant's
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relevant capacities

to invite judgements about his

criminal responsibility.

Not only do experts make judgements which

immediately imply others about responsibility,
but the
latter judgements are concealed as such from the
jury.

The jury will not hear any expert testimony directly
about the defendant's responsibility because the
court

recognizes the jury might be unduely influenced. However,
the jury is influenced by testimony about the capacities
of the defendant which implies facts about his responsibility. This leaves the jury in no better position

than if the witnesses were more direct, since, in the
end, the jury is not left to decide on responsibility,

but rather only to make a simple logical calculation; in
fact the jury is worse off since matters are so obscured

by the indirectness of the testimony.

Any test of insanity, which defines insane
criminal irresponsibility, is in effect a set of

necessary and sufficient conditions for criminal irresponsibility due to insanity. The focus of the expert testimony
will, of necessity, be on the conditions of irresponsi-

bility given in the test. To ask an expert to take the
stand and then to forbid testimony about the defendant's

capacities, his ability to control his behavior, and so
on, would be senseless since these are the major issues
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with which the psychiatrist may be of some help.
It is clear enough that Bazelon's test is not
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
irrespon-

sibility due to insanity. However, the issues will not go
away with the adoption of a new test, and the expert

who testifies, under Bazelon's test or any other, that
the defendant could (not) control his behavior is testi-

fyingabout the defendant's responsibility

—

a fact that

surely will not escape the jury. The fact is that no
test, however clever, can conceal the fact that the

psychiatrist is testifying about the central legal-moral
issue.

The reason why psychiatric witnesses cannot
avoid testifying about the ultimate issue is that, -with
a

plea of insanity, the defendant's mental state is the

central issue; it is virtually the same issue as that of
the defendant's responsibility. In such a trial, facts
about the defendant's psychology are determinative of

legal-moral decisions.

for instance, the defendant

suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the

committing of the crime, such that he could not be

expected to be able to control his behavior (or to know
what he was doing, etc.), then the defendant is innocent;
he should not be held responsible. The hypothesis is

psychological, and expresses just the sort of facts we

would expect to hear from psychiatric witnesses. These
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psychological facts are not separate from the legalmoral issue, but are rather determinative of the appro-

priate legal-moral outcome.
It is true that in certain cases the jury

will have to reach a verdict independently of the psychiatric evidence. This will be the case when this evidence
is inconsistent due to conflicting testimony, or else

insufficient because the relevant psychological state of
the defendant cannot be discovered by the experts. In
such cases the jury must weigh what facts it has to reach
a verdict, and it is arguable that this is generally

what the jury must do, since there is usually conflicting
testimony.

However, the fact that there may be insufficient

psychological evidence to determine the verdict does not
imply that psychiatric witnesses are not testifying about
the ultimate issue; it only shows, what is obvious

anyway, that there may not be enough straightforward

information about the defendant's mental state to reach
a verdict on the basis of that information alone. This is

not a desirable situation because it leaves the jury to

make a determination on very subjective grounds, or on

their best guesses.

The courts have never recognized that the
issues of the defendant's mental state and his responsi-

bility are as interdependent as they are. Instead they

.
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insist that the experts should confine their testimony

within their domain and not encroach on that of the
jury — — as if there is some sharp boundary between these
domains. The irony of this is that the tests themselves

define criminal irresponsibility due to insanity in terms
of a mental disorder and/or the relation between a mental

disorder and an act. Mental abnormality and its relation
to behavior is much of the subject matter of psychology

and psychiatry. The bare minimum condition for being

responsible or punishable for some act is that one did
the act consciously and intentionally

—

and the law

reflects this fact in the doctrine of mens rea

.

The

concerns of psychology on the one hand, and the law on
the other are simply not so distinct as Bazelon, and the

courts in general would seem to believe

The upshot of these considerations about evidence at a trial with a plea of insanity is this: The

insanity defense is unworkable because it is at the
same time unacceptable and inevitable that experts will

dominate such a proceeding. The experts' domination over
the proceeding is inevitable because the psychiatric

witnesses are alone in possession of the information
most relevant to the jury's verdict; it is unacceptable
because the jury cannot understand and evaluate the

expert testimony. Perhaps the experts themselves should
make the final decision, and this possibility will be
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considered in Chapter III

.

Although experts would clearly

"dominate" the proceeding if they were in the position

both to provide the hearing with crucial testimony and
to make the final decision, the obvious advantage would
be that the testimony would be understood by those who

reached the verdict.
Of course, many trials, in many areas of the

law introduce expert testimony before juries. Antitrust
suits, for example, may become

deeply involved in

technical economics. Thus the problem of expert domination
is not unique to the insanity defense. Some experts, like

ballistics experts, are generally state witnesses whose

•

testimony is not contradicted by any defense expert
witness. Trials which involve this sort of expert

testimony do not encounter many of the problems surrounding
the expert testimony at trials with an insanity plea,

since many of these result from the jury’s inability
to weigh the merits of conflicting testimony. While
it is not by any means the purpose of this paper to call

the jury system into question, it may well be that there
is a general problem with jury trials in cases where

there is conflicting expert testimony which is not well

understood by the jury. And it may be that the merits of
the jury system are outweighed in these trials, and that
the defendant should have the right to choose some other

kind of trial.
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Group

2;

Some Problems About Fairness

A procedure may be unfair in either of two
ways. It may be such that it yields unjust solutions
to

problems or conflicts to which it is applied, or it

may be such that its very application constitutes an
injustice. Trial by ordeal exemplifies both ways in

which a procedure may be unfair. On the one hand, it
is an unlikely way of determining guilt, so that the

results of applying the procedure are likely to be unjust.
On the other hand, forcing an innocent man through an
ordeal to determine his innocence imposes harm where
none is deserved and thus the procedure victimizes
the innocent by its very application.

The insanity defense is also unfair in both
of these ways. As already noted, the problematical

insanity tests render the application of the procedure

unsatisfactory for reaching a just verdict. More seriously,
the procedure yields unjust results by omission. [sy

failing to cope fairly with insane offenders, the procedure forces those who are able to raise the defense

successfully to raise other defenses or to plead guilty.

The result is that irresponsible and therefore innocent
people are too often punished in our systemjThe

procedure is also unfair in its application because it

may traumatize those who are irresponsible by the ordeal

.
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of a criminal trial and investigation. Of course, a

criminal trial may be an ordeal for any defendant, and
not only for the

insan^ However

,

I

will argue that the

ordeal the trial represents to the insane is unfair

ecause it is, in their cases, avoidable by substituting

another procedure for the insanity defense, and because
the ordeal may well be catastrophic for the insane.

The specific workings of the insanity defense
shed some light on these problems about fairness, and
so it will be worthwhile to consider in detail how the

procedure is employed. In particular, two aspects of the
procedure are of interest; the allocation of the burden
of proof at trial, and the disposition of the defendant

upon acquittal
The Burden of Proof
an increasing number of jurisdictions,

already more than half in the United States, the

burden of proof is with the defense with

a

plea of

insanity The significance of the burden of proof

is

that whichever side bears it will lose if the jury is

not persuaded either way by evidence presented at trial.

This is an important issue in trials with the insanity
plea since j^e nature of psychiatric evidence is such
that the jury is very likily to be left with some doubt^
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The burden of proof is more of less onerous
depending upon the weight of evidence required for
proof.
The proof may be required to persuade beyond a
reasonable
doubt, or, less stringently, by a preponderance of
•

Ordinarily in a criminal trial the prosecution

must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty as charged. The "preponderance of evidence"
is the usual civil standard of proof. The reasonable

doubt standard, regardless of which side bears it, has

been considered by many to be too heavy

a

burden with

a plea of insanity on the grounds that it is simply too

easy to create a reasonable doubt. Thus whichever side
is relieved of the burden has too easy a job under this

standard.

Two intermediate possibilities exist between
those assigning the full criminal standard burden to
the defense or the prosecution by allowing either to

bear the less rigorous civil burden. The possibility of
assigning the prosecution the burden under this standard

has been pretty much ignored, largely due to a widespread
belief that the insanity defense is already too easy.

There are two main arguments for assigning the
burden to the accused. The first is that [^e law presumes
all men to be sane, and thus the defense based on insanity
is an affirmative defense, which must prove the facts to

be contrary to the presumptiorj This reasoning is intended
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to be in parity with that which allocates the
burden of

proof in ordinary criminal proceedings to the prosecution
on the grounds that all men are presumed innocent. The

underlying principle is that whichever side controverts
the legal presumption bears the b-urden of proof.

This principle, however, leads the system into
a contradiction,

^hat the defendant bears the burden of

proof of irresponsibility contradicts the principle that
he is presumed to be innocent. The presumption of innocence
requires, by law, that a defendant be acquitted unless

guilt is established by sufficient evidence. The presump-

tion is therefore binding on the jury in its deliberation^
If the defense fails to prove innocence and the state

fails to prove guilt or criminality, the law demands
'acquittal for the defendant. The presumption of sanity

requires that the jury consider the defendant sane

unless insanity is proved. Since legal guilt requires, or
implies sanity, and since sanity, plus the absence of

another excuse, plus commission of the act collectively
imply guilt, once the commission and the absence of

other excuses are established, guilt is logically

equivalent to sanity for the jury. Thus a presumption
of sanity may be, in some cases, a presumtion of guilt,

contradicting the presumption of innocence.

’
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The second argument for shifting the burden
of proof to the accused is thatfThe prosecution will

virtually never be able to dispell all reasonable doubts
about the defendant's responsibility. The evidence laid
out by the prosecution cannot reasonably be expected

to refute completely that of the

defens^ The jury

will,

in many cases, fai: to understand s>ibstantial portions
of the psychiatric testimony, and what is successfully

understood is often vague or contradictory to other
pieces of testimony. fPhus the defense will be too
easy if the burden of proof rests with the state^^
It is remarkable that this argument has had
as much success as it has. It is very bad reasoning, and

favors the prosecution in an undisguised sort of way.

That the argument goes to show is simply that the usual
criminal standard of proof is too rigorous in cases

with insanity pleas. It clearly does not follow from the
fact that the burden of proof under this standard is

too heavy that the defense and not the prosecution should

bear it, even by some lesser standard.

10. President’s Commission on Crime in the District of

Columbia Report 550 (1966).

,
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Th© issu© of thG allocation of th© burd©n of
proof is still uns©ttl©d, and th© Supr©m© Court has
rul©d that it is not a constitutional issu©.^^

Disposition on Acquittal
Wh©r© a pl©a of insanity has b©©n ©nt©r©d,
most jurisdictions r©quir© a special verdict if th©
jury acquits. A simple verdict of "not guilty" is not

often acceptable and is nowhere acceptable when other

defenses have been raised in addition to insanity. In
some states the jury may find the defendant irresponsible
but no longer insane, but this is rare. In most juris-

•

dictions a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
must be entered on acquittal, without any finding as
to the present state of the defendant's mind at verdict.
[in one third of the jurisdictions, the defen-

dant's mental condition at the time of his disposition
will not be considered. In these states the defendant is

automatically committed to a hospital if acquittec^ The
automatic hospitalization is ordered by the judge and in
a very few states the "hospital" may in fact be a jail,
a prison, or the custody of the sheriff.

11

.

Lei and

v.

Oregon

,

12

343 U.S. 790, 798-799 (1952).

12. Henry Weihofen, Mental Disorder and the Criminal
Defense p. 372.
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In those states in which hospitalization is
not mandatory, it is discretionary and usually conditioned

on a finding that the defendant presents a threat to

himself or to others. The decision to commit may come at
the verdict or after a post trial hearing on that issue.

The commitment, if ordered, is always indefinitely long,
until release is gained by proof of the defendant’s

having recovered sanity, unless commitment is for life.
In Massachusetts, for instance, a person acquitted by
reason of insanity for murder or manslaughter is auto-

matically committed for life.

131

—

....

Jin many jurisdictions

proof of regained sanity will not be sufficient for
release unless there is also proof that there is no

substantial danger of a relaps^

The widely held presumption is that one who
has been judged to have been insane at the time of the

committing of the crime is still insane at the time of the
verdict. In one third of the states, where commitment on

acquittal is mandatory, the presumption is not even

open to dispute. Furthemore, in jurisdictions in which

commitment is at the court's discretion, it is generally

permissible for the judge to order hospitalization on
the basis of a presumption of continued insanity and

danger to the community.

13. Brakel & Rock, eds.. The Mentally Disabled a nd the Law
(Chicago: U, of Chicago Press, 1961), Table 11.1, p. 434.

.

.
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In some jurisdictions judicial decisions
have
found such fault with the mandatory commitment
provisions
of the insanity defense that such commitment
is never
ordered. Thus in the District of Columbia, for
instance,
in the case of Bolton v. Harris

.

(395 F. 2d 642 (D.C. Cir.

1968)), the Court of Appeals found mandatory commitment,
as well as the presumption of continued insanity, unwar-

ranted and reactionary in the face of the supposedly
liberal Durham rule. Thus in some jurisdictions the

acquitted defendant will be committed only if the judge
finds, upon special hearing, that the defendant should

not be f ree

The current disposition practice of indeterminate commitment of acquitted defendants seems to be
justified as follows; Curing an insane offender takes
an unpredictable amount of time. To release an uncured

offender poses a serious risk of permitting another offense
since the condition that precipitated the first offense,

insanity, has not been removed. On the other hand, to

confine an offender after he has been cured serves no
purpose, and imposes unnecessary unhappiness on the

defendant. Thus commitment for a longer period or a

shorter period than required for cure is not as desirable
as commitment for the indeterminate period required for

cure

45
I

The argument justifies only individual acts of
committing an acquitted irresponsible offender indeter^iriately , but it does not justify the practice. While

^ct of committing an insane offender indeterminately

may have the effect of keeping that offender confined
for all and only the time during which he is dangerous
or uncured, the practice has the effects of allowing the

insane to be wrongly imprisoned and of releasing them

from prison uncured. frhe defense, after all, seeks
the strategy which will, among other things, minimize
the defendant's confinement, and the practice of

indeterminate commitment renders the insanity defense
an unattractive strategy

The result of the practice,

then, is that many who could successfully raise the

defense, and who are perhaps dangerously insane, follow
some other strategy such as plea bargaining, pleading

diminished responsibility, and the like. The result of
this is that the defendant who is insane ends up in

prison rather than in a hospital, so that upon release
he has wrongfully suffered punishment and has received
no hint of any sort of therapy for his disease. As one

premise of the argument for indeterminate commitment
implies, to release an insane offender before he has

received therapy is risky and wrong.

The practice of committing irresponsible
offenders for a period comparable to the sentence for the
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crime charged would result in the release of fewer, and
not more uncured offenders than the practice of indeter-

minate commitment. The practice of determinate commitment

would reduce the incentive for insane offenders to go to

prison instead of a hospital. This would tend to increase
the number of the insane who got some therapy before

release. Those who go to hospitals under such a practice
are released no sooner than they would be from prison.

Furthermore, commitment for a period comparable to the

sentence for the crime charged is substantial even if it
is not altogether sufficient for cure, since charges

against which one is likely to raise the insanity defense
are generally severe. Thus determinate commitment would
not mean short or insubstantial commitment.

The Trauma of Criminal Trial

The insanity defense is a procedure designed
to cover two main issues at trial: the determination of

criminal guilt, just as in any other criminal trial
procedure, and the consideration of the defendant's
special excuse of insanity or irresponsibility. The

nature of the excuse offered is such that it should be

permitted consideration on its own merits before proceding with the criminal trial.
We may begin to see that this is so by
analoconsidering a situation which is in a certain way

.
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gous to that in which the insanity plea is raised.

Suppose that a child upsets and breaks a lamp, but

claims that he did not mean to do it, he just began to
feel dizzy or sick and fell against the lamp. Unless

grounds for suspecting the excuse arise, the adult will
no doubt consider the excuse and its implications first

before pressing the child to determine his degree of
guilt. If the excuse fails to convince, then the adult

might begin to consider issues of mens re a (and malingeringl

)

When a crime has been committed, and a plea
of insanity entered, the defendant is subjected to the

usual treatment of a person charged with a criminal
act, except that the insanity pleader will not likely

be released on bail and so will probably spend the duration
of the trial in jail or in a hospital. At trial, the

prosecutor may parade witnesses before the court whose
testimony is designed to show that the defendant is
bad and not sick; that he should be treated with retri-

bution for his deed and not with pity. Also, the prosecutor may attempt to draw the focus of the court away
from the excuse, or to cast aspersions on the excuse
itself, or, as in the Brawner case, on the evidence

supporting the excuse. Furthermore, while most defendants

enjoy a presumption that they are innocent, even if they
have confessed, the insanity pleader is usually, by
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virtue of bearing the burden of proof, presumed to be
guilty. All these features of a criminal trial may

bring serious pressures upon those who are already sick.

The characteristic in common between the
child in the above example and the insanity pleader is
that the excuses offered, if true, have consequences

which may require attention and not just exculpation;
and an uninhibited investigation of guilt may be in

conflict with the needs implied by the excuse. Thus the

child may be in need of medical attention, and post-

poning or delaying that for the purposes of proving guilt
seems unjust. Similarly, the excuse offered by the insanity

pleader is such that an investigation of criminality may
well aggravate the condition which counts as his excuse.

This will not add any strength to the excuse itself,
but this relation between excuse and trial may in some

cases give good reason to postpone the criminal trial
until the excusing condition has been considered.
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CHAPTER III
We have several independent moral standards
by which we may judge the relative merits of the
insanity

defense and any alternative procedure for exculpating

irresponsible offenders.
(1)

The procedure should be likely to have a high
success rate of actually exculpating those who
are irresponsible.

(2)

The procedure should be likely to exculpate only
insane irresponsible offenders.

(3)

The procedure should not inflict harm where none
is deserved.

(4)

The procedure should be constitutional.

These four standards seem to be intuitively
sound. While there is no way to provide any proof of

their soundness in the absence of a moral theory, there
are independent reasons for accepting them. (1) is

implied by the principle that insanity may count as a

valid excuse and that insane irresponsibility should
exculpate.

(2)

and (3) are inconsistent with utilitarianism,

which might mitigate against them. However, the implication
that guilt is neither necessary nor sufficient grounds
for punishment has been the source of a good deal of

embarrassment to that theory, and

I

take it that the

very strong intuitions that most of us have that the
guilty should be punished and not the innocent are the
ultimate source of this embarrassment. Thus

(1)

-

(3)
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are at least on a strong intuitive ground. There are

clearly counter-examples to (3), however

I

am taking

none of (1) - (4) as absolute standards. It seems right
to say that of two procedures, the one which inflicts

the least amount of undeserved harm is, at least for
that reason, to be preferred. (4) is also not to be

taken as absolute, since it may well be that the best
solution would require a constitutional amendment.
However, of two otherwise equally preferred procedures,
if one is constitutional while the other is not, the

constitutional procedure will be preferable. This will
be so both because the constitutional procedure will

more certainly be consistent with the rest of the system
of criminal justice, and because it will be more likely
to be implemented.

Some Desirable Features

The four standards are suggestive of certain
features which would be desirable in any procedure to
serve as an alternative to the insanity defense. In

combination these features describe the skeleton of
an alternative procedure which will measure up to the
/

standards better than the insanity defense does.

I

will now consider some alterations which seem promising
in light of their adaptability to meeting the standards.

:
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If

procGdurG is to havG a high succgss

ratG of Gxculpating all and only thosG who arG irrGsponsiblG, it must bG dGsignod to maximizG thG chancGs of

discovGring who is and who is not rGsponsiblG. To
enhancG thG chancGs of dGtGrmining rGsponsibility

corrGctly
(a)

,

thG following fGaturGs should bG incorporatGd

^ must

bG clGar what nGGds to bG GstablishGd

.

ThG

tGsts individually havG sGrvGd to blurr this mattGr, but
in thG aggrGgatG, thGy havG providGd us with a variGty
of VGry plausiblG sufficiGnt conditions for irrGsponsibility

—ThG
—ThG

accusGd did not know what hG was doing.
accusGd did not undGr stand thG contGxt of his act
or its most obvious consGquGncGs including possible
punishment; or else was substantially unable to appreciate
any of these things even though in some restricted sense
he knew them.
The accused was unable to control his behavior.
The accused was so sick or disabled as to be unable to
have a motive or mens rea

—
—

.

These conditions have all been accepted by
the courts at some point, and those that have been

rejected have been so mainly because they are, by themselves, incomplete.

This list or one similar to it could be used
to focus the inquiry. The main drawback to the use of a
list of sufficient conditions for irresponsibility is

that it makes establishing responsibility more difficult

than it should be. To ease this difficulty one or two
of the conditions could be chosen early in the hearing
as the most applicable in the particular case. Once the

.
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most plausibly applicable condition is isolated, esta-

blishing responsibility should only require establishing
that this condition did not hold.

The list of conditions could be much longer
and more clearly spelled out than the one above, and

could be made adaptable to changing views in psychiatry
by providing that the list may be added to.
(b)

The best available evidence about the defendant

*

s

responsibility should be had by the body that makes the

determination

.

As

I

have argued above, the issues of

responsibility and insanity are inseparable when the
defense of insanity is raised. The deciding body should

have the most accurate description available of the
defendant’s mental state, and this suggests that the

deciding body should not be a jury of laymen. Since the
ultimate isues with the defense of insanity are legal
and psychiatric, the body making the determination should
be made up of persons with expertise in one of these
areas. The most relevant information to the determination
is simply not accessible to a jury of laymen. Constitu-

tionally based objections to this proposal will be considered below.
(c)

In order to maximize the chances of exculpating

and only the irresponsible

,

the procedure which

applied

with a plea of insanity should not be such that those
are in fact irresponsible will not even raise

^

a 13^

w^

defen^
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because of the harsh consequences of doinq so

.

The only

way to open the defense is to impose an upper limit on
the duration of allowable involuntary commitments. How

to determine these upper limits is an enormous problem,
and one which

I

will not confront. However, one very

reaonable step in the right direction is to require
that maximum involuntary commitment may not exceed the

maximum sentence for the crime with which the defendant
is charged. The important change to make in the current

procedure is to impose whatever upper limit is necessary
to open the defense up to those who are irresponsible.

As long as the precedure imposes unreasonably long
involuntary commitments upon those who are acquitted,
it cannot possibly have a very high probability of

exculpating the irresponsible.

There are two main objections that might be
raised here. The first is that whatever is done to make
the defense of insanity more attractive to those who are

innocent will also make it more so for those who are
guilty. (No aspect of our criminal system seems to

arouse more fears about letting the guilty go

fi^ee

than

limits
the insanity defense.) Surely there are upper
I

defense. However,
which would attract the guilty to the

decisions rather
by allowing psychiatrists to make the
findings will be
than a jury, the precision of the
of sham insanity
enhanced, thus lessening the chances
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pleas being successful for the guilty. Also, if the
commitment and sentence are similar in length, it is

neither dangerous to the community nor advantageous to
the defendant to have him committed and confined in a

hospital, rather than in a prison.

The second objection is that the upper limit
would inevitably allow some insane persons, who are still
dangerous, to be released into the community; what should
be relevant for release is that the patient is not

dangerous, and not that some arbitrary time limit has
run up. To this objection are two responses. One is

that the law provides for civilly committing persons

who are dangerous and so, if the patient is still clearly

dangerous at the end of the commitment period, he may
be committed civilly. Secondly, any person who is so

sick that hospitalization for a period as long as the
sentence for a serious crime cannot render him non-dan-

gerous should not be discouraged from raising the insanity
defense. To discourage such a person is to force him
into the penal system, and he is not very likely to
be harmless after his sentence is up.

In certain cases, the criminal trial may

unjustifiably inflict harm on innocent irresponsible
defendants. It is desirable to allow for the consider-

ation of the defense of insanity before the criminal
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to allow the defendant to avoid having

unnecessary harm inflicted upon him.
On the other hand, in certain cases the
defense of insanity can only be made strong by testimony
on the part of the defendant or other witnesses which

may

tejnd to

incriminate the defendant. To require that

the defense be considered before criminal trial would

probably violate the Fifth Amendment, especially if the
evidence presented at the hearing could be admitted or

used against the defendant at trial. A procedure which
forced the defendant to reveal facts which could be of
use to the prosecutor or else to forego his strongest

defense would also violate standard

(1)

by in effect

closing the defense to such defendants; raising the
defense would then increase the likelihood of conviction.

Thus the procedure most likely to satisfy
standards (1) and (4) will be one which allows the defendant to choose when he will raise the defense for

consideration in a separate hearing. By incorporating
this flexibility into the procedure, the infliction of

undeserved harm may be minimized. At present, most
jurisdictions permit the court and the prosecutor to raise
the defense for the defense. As long as raising the

defense does not also raise the risk of indeterminate
commitment, allowing the court or the prosecutor to
raise the defense will not jeopardize the defendant.
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In light of the above -reconunended alterations
to the insanity defense, we may outline a special

alternative procedure by which the defense of insanity

may be raised. The special procedure, which we will call
"the insanity defense*" will not replace the current

procedure, the insanity defense, but will be available
as an alternative to it. The insanity defense* should

incorporate the folowing features:
(

i)

The insanity defense* should permit the defendant

to present his case to a panel of experts rather than
to a jury of laymen

.

The exact makeup of the panel may be a matter
of jurisdictional preference, but there should be at

least one member of the bar for the jurisdiction and
at least one licensed psychiatrist. Also present at

the insanity defense* should be the defendant and

counsel. It may also be advisable to have the prosecutor

present, although this will present special evidentiary

problems if a criminal trial results from the findings
of the hearing, since evidence presented at the hearing

should not be admissible at trial. The special hearing
should have the power to subpoena witnesses.

The adversary process is probably not the
delicate
most adequate for determining responsibility. The
state
issues involved in discovering with pricision the

approach similar
of the defendant's mind may require an

.
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to that taken by mental hospitals, where decisions of a

similar nature, and often with similar legal implications,
are made regularly. Members of the legal profession on

the panel, as well as the prosecutor if present, should
be entrusted with ensuring that the appropriate legal

issues are considered, and not simply the interest
of the defendant
(

ii

)

The concept of criminal irresponsibility due to

insanity should be clearly and, if necessary, extensively

defined by law for the panel

.

To employ a vague and thereby flexible standard
of insane irresponsibility is to introduce, at every

trial or hearing in which the defense is raised, an

ex post facto

law. To convict a person on the basis of

a vague or inclear test therefore violates due process.

While much has been made of the insadequacies
of the insanity defense tests, many of these deficiencies

bear specifically upon the communication between expert

witnesses and juries. Thus, for the purposes of the
insanity defense* some extensive compilation of these

tests may be adequate, even if such would not be adequate
for the purposes of a jury trial.
(iii) **Burden of proof,” such as it is in a special

hearing of this nature, should rest w ith the state.
To impose this burden upon the state is not
since the
to require of it that it prove responsibility,

.
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hearing should probably not be an adversary proceeding.
The force of the burden of proof here is only that the
panel should find the defendant irresponsible in the

absence of sufficient evidence either way.
(iv) The panel should find the defendant- "irresponsible

(innocent) of the crime charged against
**of

him*'

or else

sound mind and responsible for his actions at the

time of the commission of the crime. ”

There should also be some provision for the

possibility that the panel is unable to make any finding,
as for instance when the members cannot reach any

consensus
(v)

If the defendant is found irresponsible, he is

acguitted of the crime witn which he is charged

.

If the state believes the acquitted defendant
to be insane and dangerous, civil commitment procedings

should be held before the defendant's release. Otherwise,
or if commitment is found unwarranted, the defendant

should be released.

Since civil commitment of an acquitted defendant
the insanity
is the indirect result of his having raised

defense*,

there should be some limits set for the maximum

permissible involuntary commitment of an acquitted
defense*
defendant. Without this provision, the insanity
in virtue of the
will simply be closed to most defendants

outcome.
possibility, or probability, of too harsh an

59

Indeterminate commitment, as well as commitment for
longer than criminal sentences do not have the supposed
effect of detaining dangerously insane persons; instead

this practice has the effect of forcing the dangerously
insane to raise defenses other than insanity, whereby

they are often inappropriately shunted into the criminal
penal system, and upon release they have received no
therapy. Even if upper limits allow for the release of

dangerously insane persons, their absence has exactly
the same effect, only worse since the release is from

prisons instead of from hospitals.
(

vi

)

If the defendant is found responsible for his actions

at the time of the crime, he should go to trial if he has

not already been tried and convicted
.

.

If the defendant has already been convicted

before the insanity defense* hearing, his conviction
stands if that hearing finds him responsible. If he has
not yet been tried, he should go to trial. In this case,
the only diversion from the ordinary criminal procedure

should be that the judge instructs the jury as follows:

A special hearing has been conducted to consider the
issue of the defendant's mental state on
(date and tim^ of the crime). The defendant has been
found to have been of sound mind at that time, and
responsible for any acts he committed. No finding
was made or considered as to whether or not the
defendant did the act with which he is charged.
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A inotion for a spGcial hGarinq to consid 0 r thG
issue of insa nity may be made and may be granted at
any
tiine

during the criininal procedure after arrest and

before completion of sentence (if defendant is found
guilty)

.

The motion for such a hearing should be
granted at the discretion of the judge, and may be made
by the defense, the prosecutor, or the judge. The motion
should be granted if the judge finds reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant was not responsible when
the crime was committed.

The insanity defense* may therefore raise the
issue of insanity at any time during trial. However, to

avoid unnecessary or intentional discontinuity of the
trial, any motion for a special hearing made during the

trial must be supported by good reason why the hearing

should be held interrupting the trial rather than before
or after the trial.
(viii) The insanity defense, in its present form, may be

raised at trial

.

To deny a defendant the right to raise the

insanity defense before a jury at trial has been ruled

unconstitutional in Louisiana, and is probably in

violation of the United States Constitution as well.
In 1928 Louisiana instituted a procedure for considering
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the insanity issue separately before a "lunacy commission"

which was empowered to commit if the defendant was found
insane or to send him to trial if he was found sane. At
trial, however, the defendant was not permitted to

raise the insanity defense, and for this reason the

statute providing for this procedure was found to

violate due process and the right to a jury trial.
If the defendant is granted a pre-trial

hearing on the issue of insanity and is found to be
sane, he may still wish to raise the insanity defense at

trial. This will raise some serious problems about evidence

presented at the insanity defense* hearing.

I

will not

attempt to resolve these because the rules of evidence
in the various jurisdictions are quite complicated

and would certainly have implications about what would

and would not be permissible.

14. State V. Lange , 168, La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).

.
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Conclusion
The procedure under which insanity is
considered
as a legal excuse for criminal behavior needs
revision.

The courts, recognizing this, have recently devoted
some
effort to the task of improving the insanity tests; and

with some success. However, there are still problems with
the tests, and there are also identifiable problems with

the insanity defense which are not resolvable by simply

changing the wording of the tests. Rewording the tests
will not serve the critical function of diverting the
insane from the penal system, nor will it improve the jury's

comprehension of expert testimony.

The insanity defense*, which has been outlined
above, offers one solution to these problems. At the

same time, the insanity defense* offers some promise of

mitigating some of the lesser evils of the defense. The
insanity defense*, for example, would avoid the occasional
injustice of forcing a truely sick defendant to defend

himself in a criminal trial. The flexibility of the
timing of the special hearing seems the best way of
avoiding harmful and unnecessary prosecution of the
innocent insane
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